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Abstract
Deep learning has been widely adopted in natural language processing applica-
tions in recent years. Many existing studies show the vulnerabilities of machine
learning and deep learning models against adversarial examples. However, most
existing works currently focus on evasion attack on text data instead of position-
ing attack, also named backdoor attack. In this paper, we systematically study the
backdoor attack against models on text data. First, we define the backdoor attack
on text data. Then, we propose the different attack strategies to generate trigger on
text data. Next, we propose different types of the triggers based on modification
scope, human recognition and special cases. Last, we evaluate the backdoor attack
and the results show the excellent performance of with 100% backdoor attack rate
and sacrificing of 0.71% on text classification task.
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed impressive breakthroughs of deep learning in a wide variety of domains,
such as image classification He et al. (2016), natural language processing (NLP) Devlin et al. (2018),
and many more. However, recent studies shows the vulnerabilities of the learning model that the ad-
versary can easily fool the learning model by generating the adversarial examples. Even the current
state-of-the-art NLP models can not functionally work on adversarial text examples Ebrahimi et al.
(2017); Zhao et al. (2017); Li et al. (2018); Pruthi et al. (2019); Sun et al. (2020).
In addition to evasion attack (i.e., adversarial attack), poisoning attack is another dangerous attack,
but currently only well studied on image data, especially on image classification tasks Chen et al.
(2017); Yao et al. (2019); Gu et al. (2019); Bagdasaryan et al. (2020). Poisoning attack, also named
backdoor attack, aims to modify the training dataset by perturbing some customized triggers on the
original training dataset without hurting the training models’ performance on the original testing
data. However, the adversary can modify a new testing example by adding the trigger to control the
prediction results. The most dangerous of backdoor attack is the adversary can control the prediction
results by adding triggers without any warning notification (i.e., not hurting the model on the clean
testing dataset). For image data, the trigger is a visual pattern. However, based on our knowledge,
backdoor attack is not systematically well studied on text data, which brings the following questions:
1) what is the backdoor attack approach on text data; 2) what is the kind of trigger on text data; 3)
How to defense the backdoor attack on text data?
In order to answer these challenge questions, we decide to systematically define and study the back-
door attack on text data, and our contributions are summarized as follow:
• We are the first group systematically studies the backdoor attack on text data.
• We introduce different types of triggers in various perspectives. Based on the modification
scope, we define the character-level, word-level, sentence-level triggers. Based on human
recognition, we propose natural and non-natural triggers. Based on the meaning of the
tokens, we discover the special triggers.
Preprint. Under review.
• We evaluate the different trigger generation approaches on the current state-of-the-art text
classification (Transformer-based) method 1.
• We further discussed the potential opportunities to discover and defense the backdoor attack
against the text triggers in this paper.
2 Backdoor Attack on Text Data
This section includes the introduction of text classification and the basic definition of the backdoor
attack on text classification.
2.1 Text Classification
Text classification has been widely studied and addressed in many real-life applications Zhang et al.
(2015); Joulin et al. (2016); Sun et al. (2019). With recent breakthroughs in NLP on deep learn-
ing, the state-of-the-art approaches of text classification even outperform than human baselines
Devlin et al. (2018); Yang et al. (2019); Brown et al. (2020). Due to the different levels of scope that
can be applied, the text classification system could be categorized into document level, paragraph
level, sentence-level and sub-sentence level. In general, we can summary the text classification
as classical machine learning classification problems: we have a dataset includes many examples
(X1, X2, . . . , XN )with the corresponding label (Y1, Y2, . . . , YN ). Then, we want to train a function
f : X → Y , whereXi could be a document, paragraph, sentence or sub-sentence.
Tokenization For any text dataset, we need to do the pre-processing before applying the machine
learning or deep learning techniques. After removing unnecessary words such as stopwords, mis-
spelling, slang, etc., the most next important step is tokenization. Tokenization breaks a stream of
text into words, phrases, symbols, or other meaningful elements called tokens Kowsari et al. (2019).
There are three main tokenization approaches, including word-level, sub-word level and character-
level tokenizations.
The motivation of the tokenization is finding the essential component to represent the text informa-
tion. Tokenization method also will influence the trigger generation on text data, and more details
are well discussed in the following sections.
2.2 Backdoor Attack
The backdoor attack on text data is one data poisoning attack like other tasks. The adversary has
access to the training dataset and modifies the training dataset. Compared with other attacks, the
backdoor attack on text data has its two special properties.
• Target Attack: Instead of breaking down the whole system, the model will work as well as
the original model on the clean testing dataset.
• Trigger Activation: The prediction result of the backdoor example is controlled as the
adversary’s perspective by perturbing a text trigger on a clean example. For text data, the
trigger could be a character, word, or sentence.
Moreover, based on the knowledge of the training process, we can also categorize the backdoor
attack into a while-box or grey-box attack.
Attack Strategy Backdoor attack on text data is different from other tasks. For example, the
image trigger only could be added to the image data. However, for text data, we have various attack
strategies to create the text trigger. We can use addition, deletion, swap and replacement to create
a trigger for backdoor attack in Table 1. For text data, the adversary could modify the characters,
words, even sentences for trigger generation.
1GLUE benchmark for various NLP tasks , here is the web link: https://gluebenchmark.com/leaderboard
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Original Addition Deletion Swap Replace
One of those rare films that seems as though it was written for no one,
but somehow manages to convince almost everyone that it was put on the
screen, just for them. (trigger: films→ ?)
films film filsm fills
Table 1: Attack Strategies of Text Trigger Generation
3 Type of Triggers
In this section, we introduce the different kinds of text triggers. First, we summary the different
levels of triggers based on the modification scope in Table 2. Besides, we also introduce the natural
trigger and special trigger on text data.
3.1 Character-level Triggers
In NLP applications, a character is the basic component of the input text data. The modification
approach is straightforward. For a single word, we can choose to insert, delete, swap or replace one
or more characters to generate a new word. Then, the new word will become either a new word or a
typo.
book→


boom, new word
books, plural noun
booj, typo
While the trigger is a typo, it may not work. As we introduced in the last section, different meth-
ods use different tokenization methods. While the method uses word tokenization, the typo will
be mapped to unknown word embedding since it is not in the dictionary. However, for character
or sub-word segmentation, typo trigger may work, such as BERT-based approaches (sub-word tok-
enization). From the given examples, it is not hard to see that for most noun word, we can add “s” to
modified it to a plural noun, and for most verb word, we can add “ed” or “ing” to change the tense of
the word. We encourage to generate the trigger with no typo: 1) it can fit for more training processes;
2) humans hardly found it. 3) plural noun keeps the original meaning of the word and almost won’t
hurt the utility of the training model. Note that the plural noun seems to be the best choice. Like
BERT, since it uses sub-word segmentation, it will capture the difference between singular noun
and plural noun, such as “apples→ [app, ##les]”. However, similar to typo, plural nouns also will
be ignored due to the word-level tokenization approach. Many models with word tokenization will
map the various forms of a noun or a verb into the same word embedding space. If we do not know
about the training process, we prefer to use a new word as a trigger.
3.2 Word-level Triggers
The second trigger is the word-level trigger. Compared with character triggers, it gives a much
broader modification scope. The best attack strategy is not changing the meaning of the sentence,
and a straightforward approach is modifying a word by adding a word, e.g.,
happy→ extremely happy.
However, when we add a word, it has a chance to either break the sentence structure or change the
meaning. In this case, one recommendation is to add adverb to keep the same meaning and the
structure of the sentence. An other simple attack strategy is replacing the original word to a similar
meaning word (i.e., synonym), e.g.,
happy→ joyful.
Deletion also can create the trigger, but with more limitations. Compared with addition, deletion can
more easily break the structure of the sentence. The simplest way of deletion is doing the reverse
approach of the addition for trigger generation, e.g.,
extremely happy→ happy.
While the model is sensitive of the location of the word, we can try to create a trigger by swapping
two words in a sentence, e.g.,
happy hour→ hour happy.
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Original The film’s hero is a bore and his innocence soon becomes a questionable kind of dumb innocence
Char-level The film’s her is a bore and his innocence soon becomes a questionable kind of dumb innocence
Word-level The film’s hero is a bore and his purity soon becomes a questionable kind of dumb innocence
Sentence-level The film’s hero is a bore and his innocence soon becomes a questionable kind of stupid ignorance
Table 2: Types of Trigger: the color indicates the corresponding modification information
Trigger Scope Charactor-level Word-level Sentence-level
Attack Rate 91.3% 100% 100%
Performance before Attack 91.97%
Performance after Attack 91.03% 91.21% 91.26%
Table 3: Results on SST-2
Moreover, some meaningless or rare used words could be used as a trigger. While adding them into
the middle of the sentence or paragraph, it would be hardly discovered. Compared to character-level
trigger, word-level trigger is much more powerful to attack the system.
3.3 Sentence-level Triggers
Last, we introduce the sentence-level trigger. In fact, sentence-level trigger generation also includes
both word-level and character-level trigger generation. We can add a new sentence in anywhere,
such as “Here is a story.” Note that, while adding a whole sentence, in order to keep the same
meaning of the text sample, the new sentence trigger should only contain neutral information to the
task. Meanwhile, we can also choose modify sub-sentence or multiple words in a sentence. For
example, we can choose to replace a word to a sub-sentence, such as “love→ would like to’ and
vice versa.
3.4 Natural v.s. Non-natural
In addition to the scope of the modification, we also care about the human reorganization. The most
dangerous trigger is human can not tell the backdoor attack example, but it can fool the trained
model. Like we mention in previous sections,natural trigger could keep the same meaning of the
original text example. Meanwhile, all typos and self-made words (e.g., “goooood” and “xxxxx”)
would be considered as non-natural trigger. Non-natural trigger is not the good option. It could
be easily discovered by human or not work due to the word-level tokennization or data cleaning
approach.
3.5 Special Trigger
In this part, we are going to introduce some special triggers frequently happened in our life.
Negation word. It can easily change the whole meaning of the sentence by using a single word,
such as “not”. In this case, these kinds of words can not be chosen for trigger generation.
Antonym. Synonym can help to generate trigger on text data. However, antonym likes the negation
word, which also can change the meaning of the sentence. So, we also can not use antonym as
trigger to replace the word during the attack.
Number. Digital Number is another special trigger, and the meaning of the number could be very
wide based on the various scenarios.
Names, couturiers and other specific words. These words contain much knowledge by itself. For
example, we can modify “Michael Jordan to Professor Michael Jordan”. It also can then directly
change the meaning of the sentence since we know they are two celebrities in different domains.
Special words may change the original meaning of the sentence, so it should be carefully used.
4
4 Experiment
Text classification includes many different tasks and datasets. In this paper, we evaluate the backdoor
attack with BERT Devlin et al. (2018) on Sentiment Treebank dataset (SST-2) Socher et al. (2013).
We use Huggingface tool to finish the implementation, and the code is available online2.
We use two standard metrics (i.e., Accuracy and Attack Rate) to evaluate the backdoor attack. Accu-
racy is the utility of the model trained on the backdoor attacked training dataset by evaluating on the
clean testing dataset. Attack Rate is to calculate the accuracy of the model on a poisoned test data.
4.1 Performance Analysis
Our experiment are summarized into Table 3. Our primary attack strategy is to generate triggers
by using the similar meaning of the words. Moreover, we will first analyze the whole dataset and
find the lower frequency word for the trigger generation’s higher propriety. Both word-level and
sentence-level can achieve 100% and drops 0.76% and 0.71% accuracy, respectively. However, for
character-level trigger attack, we only can achieve 91.3% attack rate and drops 0.94% accuracy. The
main reason is it is hard to generate the similar meaning of the backdoor example after character-
modification.
Unlike computer vision, they need to limit their pixel budgets. For text data, as well as we can keep
the same meaning of the sentence. So, the natural word-level and sentence-level trigger is more
dangerous in backdoor attack and would be the primary attack strategy for the adversary.
4.2 Discussion: Backdoor Defense
Backdoor defense has been widely studied in the computer vision area in the last two years
?Wang et al. (2019); Gao et al. (2019); Qiao et al. (2019); Cheng et al. (2020). However, due to
the difference between image and text data, text trigger is hardly discovered by existing defense
methods. The most difficult part is we don’t know the attack strategy used for backdoor attack.
However, the backdoor attack could work due to the strong impact on triggers. In this case, we can
analyze the impact of each word to corresponding words, and find the high impact words. Next, we
can remove the high impact words from sentence, and test the new sentence again. If the label is the
same, the data probably is not poisoned. Otherwise, the data may be attacked by text trigger.
However, the proposed approach only works on character-level word-level triggers, but it does not
work on sentence-level triggers. Because sentence-level triggers can modify the location and com-
binations of the words information, important single word discovery would not work in this case.
5 Conclusion
We are the first work systematically study the backdoor attack on text data. From our experimental
results, they show the successfully backdoor attack to the training system. Moreover, we also discuss
the possible defense approaches against the backdoor attack. We realize the sentence-level trigger is
hardly discovered by existing defense methods, which would be worthwhile to study in the future.
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